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Introduction
The hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is the largest annual gathering of people in the 
world for a religious purpose. But in the era of imperialism, pilgrims increasingly 
travelled  under  European regulations  from homelands  under  non-Muslim rule  in 
order to begin their pilgrimage. Britain, which ruled the largest number of Muslims 
in the world by the early twentieth century, was the most important non-Muslim 
power involved with the hajj. Colonial bureaucracy related to the pilgrimage began 
in the 1860s and evolved in complexity until decolonization in the 1950s. This paper 
seeks to answer  why Britain became interested in the hajj, and trace how 
and why British  involvement  in its  various aspects  changed over time. 
These aspects include: disease, security, pauper pilgrims, Muslims employed 
by the British, and interactions between Britain and the Hashemite and 
Saudi regimes who ruled the Hejaz after 1916.
For an annual event of such size and importance, it is surprising the history of the 
hajj  has  not  received  more  scholarly  attention. The  main  works  related  to  the 
colonial  period  are  few in  number,  such  as  chapters  in  Sugata  Bose’s  Hundred 
Horizons and Mark Harrison’s  Public Health in British India, and articles by William 
Roff, Michael Low and Michael Miller. While all are valuable, they tend to focus on 
disease and security issues and the hajj from India. This paper will go beyond these 
works by looking at as yet unexplored topics and adopting a more transnational 
approach, referring to other British territories such as Malaya, Egypt,  Sudan and 
Nigeria.
This paper  uses  colonial  records  from  archives  in  London,  Durham,  Delhi  and 
Bombay. My doctoral research when completed will redress the bias in this paper 
towards British sources that reflect British perspectives, once translation work is 
complete on hajj accounts and Muslim government records in Arabic and Urdu, from 
Egypt and India. 
First, a brief summary of the hajj itself, which has pre-Islamic origins. These rituals 
are:  Each  person  walks  counter-clockwise  seven  times  around  the  Kaaba,  the 
building in the centre of the Holy Mosque at Mecca; kisses the Black Stone in the 
corner  of  the  Kaaba;  runs  back  and  forth  between  the  hills  of  Al-Safa  and  Al-
Marwah; drinks from the Zamzam Well; goes to the plains of Mount Arafat to stand 
in vigil; and throws stones in a ritual Stoning of the Devil. The pilgrims then shave 
their heads, perform a ritual of animal sacrifice, and celebrate the three day festival 
of Eid. If the spiritual experience of the hajj can be summarised, the end of Ikbal Ali 
Shah’s 1928 pilgrimage account seems apt: “From life I need nothing more. I have 
been to Mecca, the cradle of my faith”1
Hajj early nineteenth century
The pilgrimage in the early nineteenth century comprised hajj caravans patronised 
by  Ottoman  and  Mughal  rulers  whose  journeys  were  long  with  the  danger  of 
robbery; also the cost of going on hajj was prohibitive to many Muslims. Alexander 
1 p.222, Ikbal Ali Shah, Westward to Mecca, 1928
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Ogilvie  entered  this  milieu  in  1838  as  the  first  British  consul  and  East  India 
Company agent to Jedda, a port on the Red Sea near to Mecca. Britain’s concern 
was to promote trade between the Hejaz and India, and protect British maritime 
interests in the Red Sea that had increased after the occupation of Aden in 1837. 
The hajj was of only fleeting interest. For example, the presence of Indian destitute 
pilgrims in Jedda in 1853 prompted the Consul to ask how to deal with people who 
were now British subjects. The response from India was unequivocal: 
Government does not feel  itself  compelled by legal  means to prevent the 
resort of pilgrims to the places indicated. The Governor-General’s opinion is 
that the Government has no right to prevent any person who decide to do so 
from proceeding on pilgrimage2
Disease
Britain’s policy of non-interference in the hajj  ended because of the devastating 
cholera epidemic of 1865. This outbreak killed 15,000 out of 90,000 pilgrims during 
the course of the ritual. Through the movement of pilgrims from Asia to Arabia, the 
disease spread to Egypt and across to Europe.3 The deaths of nearly 200,000 people 
worldwide  prompted  the  European  powers  to  call  an  international  sanitary 
conference in 1866. Delegates concluded that the disease originated in India and 
was  spread  to  the  Hijaz  by  pilgrims  before  it  moved  onto  Europe.  They 
recommended that quarantine stations should be established at Tor and Kameran 
Island on the northern and southern points of the Red Sea, and checks made on all 
pilgrim  ships  before  they  alighted  in  the  Hijaz,  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the 
disease spreading to Europe. Quarantine procedures, supervised by the European 
powers  and  the  Ottoman  Empire,  now  became  part  of  the  sea-going  pilgrim’s 
experience.  Fear  drove European and British  sanitary  monitoring of  the hajj,  an 
unprecedented  international  public  health  protection  measure.  The  transport 
revolution  in  the  form  of  steamships  had  also  contributed  to  the  spread  of 
epidemics. Ships owned by European companies could carry far greater number of 
pilgrims to Arabia from South and South East Asia than ever before, which increased 
the risk of disease.  The low cost of  these passages now brought the hajj  within 
reach of many more Muslims. The pilgrim’s reaction to the sanitary and quarantine 
measures was mostly resigned acceptance. However, within the pages of Urdu and 
English  newspapers  in  India,  letters  and  comment  pieces  proliferated  which 
attacked  the  quarantine  regime  as  an  unwarranted  interference  with  religious 
practice. This argument was given life by Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858 to 
India  after  the  Mutiny  of  1857,  which  guaranteed  British  non-interference  in 
indigenous religious practices.
Muslim consultation
This new governing style of caution and cooperation towards Islam in India was an 
attitude which was reflected in other Muslim territories such as Nigeria and Sudan 
which the British conquered in 1898-1902. It  meant every hajj  related measure, 
2 5th May 1854, Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, to H.L. Anderson, 
Secretary Government of Bombay, in Political, External Affairs – A, 5/5/54, National Archives 
of India, Delhi.
3 p.301, F.E. Peters, Hajj: the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and the holy places (Princeton, N.J., 1994).
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whether  legislation  regarding  pilgrim  ships,  pilgrim  passports  or  measures  to 
prevent destitute pilgrims reaching the Hejaz, was run past Muslim notables first. 
The colonial record is filled with hundreds of statements from these men, mostly 
local worthies at the district level. Often their counsel that measures were “risky” 
meant  they  were  shelved.  The  fundamental  problem  was  that  Britain  lacked 
legitimacy over Muslim subjects on matters of religion as she was a non-Muslim 
power. Especially after the shock of 1857,and in the 1880s with the Mahdi’s revolt in 
Sudan,  Britain   felt  constrained  in  implementing  anything  that  would  prevent 
pilgrims going on hajj, an attitude that only dissipated in the 1920s.The Government 
was anxious to seek out and assuage Muslim opinion, wary of any action that would 
provoke a “fanatical response”.
Security
This fear of  “fanaticism” extended to the hajj.  Because Mecca and Medina were 
closed  to  non-Muslims,  officials  were  prone  to  paranoid  speculation  about  anti 
British plots being concocted there. This attitude was not entirely based on fantasy; 
many jihadist  leaders  who were involved in anti-European uprisings in  Asia  and 
Africa began their agitation after returning from hajj. But the imaginings of officials 
were often without foundation. Bartle Frere of the Indian Foreign Department wrote 
in 1873:
The Hedjaz is the natural asylum for fanatical Moslem exiles from India who 
may there pass their lives in a congenial atmosphere of fanaticism
And, from Jedda Consul J. Zohrab in 1879:  
Representatives from every Mussulman community affords a means without 
creating suspicion to exchange opinions, discuss plans, criticize the actions of 
European governments and form combinations to resist the supremacies of 
the Christian powers
After Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s exposition of Pan-Islam in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century, official’s similar musings often had the appellation “Pan-
Islamic  intrigues”.  The  hajj  was  a  centre  where  Muslims  convened  away  from 
European control; but it appears from accounts by Muslims themselves and in the 
colonial record that the hajj was not the hive of anti-European conspiratorial activity 
that some thought.
Destitute pilgrims
As the imperial gaze focused on the hajj  in the 1860s and 1870s as quarantine 
regulations were implemented, other issues aside from plotters came to concern 
officials. One concern largely neglected by scholars was British attempts to stop so 
called pauper pilgrims from British territories. Increased sanitary surveillance of the 
hajj and the inoculation of pilgrims before embarking led to a concern that destitute 
pilgrims  would  be  the  carriers  of  the  next  epidemic.  Destitutes  from  British 
territories, such as India and Nigeria, also brought shame upon British “prestige”. 
An 1886 report on the hajj where there were over 3000 Indian destitutes lamented:
3
The hardships which these people suffer and the miserable state in which 
they live is quite heart rending to behold… their example affords a striking 
instance of how faith and religious zeal will allow them to bear every variety 
of privation and misery in the hope of a better future thereafter
British authorities felt they had a duty to help. Various measures proposed from the 
1870s to 1912 to curb pauper pilgrims were not enacted for fear of a backlash from 
Muslims who would construe it as interference in their religion”. The issue remained 
intractable, to the consternation of officials who despairingly compared the situation 
to pilgrims from other Muslim areas under European rule such as Dutch East Indies, 
and within the British Empire such as Malaya; both required all pilgrims to provide 
money for their return passage to prevent destitution.
Muslim employees
The people who tended to formulate and suggest measures like those related to 
pauper pilgrims were invariably Muslim employees within the colonial bureaucracy, 
who were of vital importance to Britain’s ability to interact with various aspects of 
the hajj. This has been overlooked in existing works, but the role of “Native Agent” 
has been analysed by James Onley in his study of the Persian Gulf Residencies. The 
first agent in Jedda was the Indian Dr. Abdur Razzack, who wrote the first report on 
the hajj  for  the British  authorities  in  1882,  in  which he castigated the Ottoman 
sanitary authorities. During Razzack’s tenure as Indian Vice Consul until 1895 he 
scrutinised  every  part  of  the  hajj  experience  and  came  up  with  multiple 
recommendations to alleviate the sufferings of pilgrims. Several of his suggestions 
were  made  into  legislation  and  government’s  policy.  Razzack’s  achievements 
foreshadowed the roles other Muslims played in the colonial bureaucracy. Britain 
would have been unable  to  have any involvement with the hajj  were it  not  for 
Muslims such as Razzack. 
Arab Revolt, Hashemites and post war
Moving forward to the First World War, British interactions with the hajj changed to 
serve a more explicitly political  purpose of bolstering her position in the Muslim 
world. Ottoman entry into the war in 1914 and the beginning of the Arab Revolt by 
Sherif  Hussein  of  Mecca  1916  meant  the  pilgrimage  attracted  increased  British 
attention. As Hussein’s chief supporter and paymaster, Britain thought a successful 
hajj would maintain Britain’s image and prestige as a protector and ruler of Muslims 
as well as garner support for Hussein, who was unpopular across the Muslim world 
for rebelling against the Sultan-Caliph. Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of 
Sudan, wrote that the hajj should be encouraged to impress upon Muslims, at least 
in Sudan, that the Ottoman regime “if not actually over, was on its last legs”.4 A 
Government of India communiqué stressed the difficulties of wartime pilgrimage but 
played  up  its  “extreme  anxiety  to  assist  the  Indian  Moslem  community  in  the 
performance of this religious duty” which meant they would make arrangements for 
the hajj in 1916. In reality, officials were keen to keep the hajj  going to support 
Hussein and demonstrate Britain’s concern to facilitate the religious obligation of 
Muslims, moves which would help neutralize any Muslim ill-will. 
4 Wingate to Wilson, 19th June 1916, SAD Wingate 137/4/29-30, SAD.
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Indian Muslim soldier pilgrims
Britain  used  the  hajj  for  further  political  propaganda  purposes  in  1918 when it 
sponsored some Indian Muslim soldiers in Egypt to go on pilgrimage. This novel 
scheme, ignored in existing studies, shows Britain’s wider political vision in using 
the hajj to shore up its image in the Muslim world. George V came up with the idea. 
Montagu, Secretary of State for India, thought the scheme “fascinating and might 
have excellent political effects” – an example of how officials were more interested 
in furthering the representation of Britain as sympathetic and supportive of Islam, 
than being concerned for the spiritual welfare of their Muslim soldiers.
The  event  was  regarded  as  a  success,  and  over  2000  soldiers  participated. 
Critically, it was an important occasion to demonstrate Britain’s commitment to its 
Muslim subjects.  Captain  Salamatulla  Khan,  leader  of  the  Indian  Muslim soldier-
pilgrims said at his meeting with Hussein, “Our government takes great care and 
thought for our religion and religious customs. In spite of transport being so scarce 
nowadays  it  has  afforded  us  a  ship  and  given  us  the  opportunity  of  doing 
pilgrimage”.5  At the same time the British used an Indian captain, Ajub Khan, to 
gather intelligence on Mecca while on the hajj. Khan was another example of how 
without Muslim help Britain could not have been involved in such a wide capacity 
with the hajj.  He was scathing of  the Hashemite government’s organization and 
stressed  the  necessity  of  further  British  involvement  with  the  hajj  in  form of  a 
hospital  and agents in Mecca,  in  order to “relieve us of  our duty to our Muslim 
subjects as well as greatly enhancing our popularity and influence in the Muslim 
world”.6 Perhaps the need to appear more imperialist than the imperialists coloured 
his views when writing the report. This propaganda exercise like many others did 
not go according to plan, as the “mulcting and cheating of the poor Indian pilgrims 
was much resented by our men” who on several occasions “resorted to violence” to 
redress perceived wrongs7 
As the war ended in 1918, authorities in London and across the Muslim areas of the 
empire were in consultation with a view to cement Britain’s role in the pilgrimage in 
terms of imposing further regulation, a far cry from the cautious attitudes of the late 
nineteenth  century.  However,  schemes  for  “improving”  the  hajj  often  had 
ambivalent practical application. 
Destitutes
This ambivalent application was seen by Sir Reader Bullard, Consul at Jedda during 
the final years of Hussein’s reign, as he touched on the issue of destitute pilgrims in 
a letter from September 1923:
We  reckon  there  were  1,200  yesterday,  pushing,  quarrelling,  yelling, 
5 Report of Commander-in-chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to War Office 31st January 1919, IOR/MIL/7/18619, 
OIOC.
6 Observations of Mecca, by Captain Ajub Khan, 2nd October 1919, attached to Report of General Officer 
Commanding Egyptian Expeditionary Force to War Office, 11th December 1919, IOR/MIL/7/18619, OIOC.
7 Report of General Officer Commanding Egyptian Expeditionary Force to War Office, 11th December 1919, 
IOR/MIL/7/18619, OIOC.
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demanding tickets, trying to push in at the gate of the Consulate. Except to 
arrange for tickets for the sick we take no notice of the destitute until the 
very last minute
Bullard’s portrait  seems similar to Razzack’s from the late 1880s. Yet by 1923 the 
Consulate  in  Jedda  was  paying  for  return  passages  for  thousands  of  destitute 
pilgrims  at  the  end  of  every  hajj.  Why? Initial  plans  in  the  1890s  for  Muslim 
communities in India to fund repatriation fell through, and the authorities decided 
preventing those who could not afford to perform the hajj would produce an adverse 
reaction. Coupled with the added pressure of numbers from Nigerian pilgrims who 
were often even poorer than Indians, the Consulate at Jedda started from the early 
1900s to repatriate pilgrims while privately fuming to their superiors that nothing 
was done to solve the issue. 
Politics of hajj
British  despair  at  pauper  pilgrims  was  mirrored  in  their  views  towards  the 
Hashemite organization of the hajj in the early 1920s. Yet Hussein’s extortion of the 
hajjis was logical. They were the only source of income for his kingdom and the 
British had halted his wartime subsidy. Nevertheless, the British failed to link these 
factors together, and privately hoped Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi followers would 
take over Mecca, and with it the hajj, which they did in October 1924.
Wahhabi takeover
British officials and Muslims welcomed this event, as Ibn Saud proclaimed he would 
reform the administration of the hajj. There was less extortion and more security, 
but the Wahhabis created dismay amongst pilgrims, especially those from Egypt 
and  India,  in  their  attitude  towards  certain  devotional  practices.  For  example, 
Wahhabi guards zealously beat hajjis who attempted pray and kiss the railings of 
the Prophet’s Tomb. It was in contravention of Wahhabi practice to worship anyone 
but  Allah.   But  economics  trumped  Wahhabism  by  the  1930s.  Hajjis  on  many 
occasions reported that if the low paid guards were bribed, praying and kissing the 
railings was tolerated. Wahhabi policy towards enforcement of religious orthodoxy 
fluctuated  throughout  the  1926-1939  period.  The  severe  effect  of  the  Great 
Depression on Saudi Arabia’s finances which were dependent on the hajj led to laxer 
attitudes  from  the  religious  authorities  towards  hajjis,  as  their  presence  in  the 
country was a vital source of income.
Destitutes
Britain did not publicly comment on Wahhabi practices. With its own pilgrims, British 
India’s  cautious  bureaucracy  had  finally  legislated  in  1925 that  those  sailing  to 
Arabia had to produce enough money for their return fare, a system that had been 
in force for decades before in Malaya, Dutch East Indies and Egypt. This temporarily 
halted the flow of destitute pilgrims but a few years later the problem had returned 
as  pilgrims  took  to  travelling  overland  from  India  or  surreptitiously  across  the 
Persian Gulf. Sir Reader Bullard, also Consul in the later 1930s, wrote after passing 
the body of an Indian pilgrim in the desert near Riyadh: 
6
Ibn  Saud discouraged destitutes  from attempting the pilgrimage,  because 
they were a danger to themselves as well as a problem to the authorities, but 
nothing could prevent a penniless Indian Moslem from begging his way across 
northern India and Baluchistan, getting a lift in a dhow across the Gulf, and 
setting out to walk to Mecca
The issue of overland pauper pilgrims had taxed authorities in Nigeria and Sudan as 
well, where pilgrims would often take years to travel to the Hijaz, working along the 
way. Nigeria established a Pilgrim Relief  Fund which relied on contributions from 
Emirs. The Saudis along with other governments tightened border controls in the 
1930s, but for poor Muslims the spiritual reward of hajj being absolution from sin 
and paradise if they died on the way meant a route could always be found.
Muslim employees
Like Dr. Razzack, Munshi Ihsanullah was another key Muslim figure within the British 
imperial administration associated with the hajj that had to contend with destitute 
pilgrims. In the interwar period, when Consuls were often in post for only a few 
years, Ihsanullah was a powerful force in lobbying and working for the welfare of 
British pilgrims who came to Hijaz. His services were considered indispensible by 
Consuls, although during an Inquiry into the administration of the hajj from India in 
1930, one official did voice concern that Ihsanullah’s knowledge of the hajj meant 
he often out classed his superiors in related discussions and recommendations for 
improvements often came from him and not the Consul. During Ihsanullah’s time, 
the non-British staff at the Jedda Consulate expanded. Abdul Majid was the Malay 
Pilgrimage Officer from 1924 to 1940;8 there were Bengali and Punjabi clerks, and 
Nigerian and Sudanese messengers. The use of Muslims in hajj administration was 
also a feature in colonial bureaucracies from Nigeria to Malaya. Britain could not 
have been involved in the hajj in the ways outlined during this period if it were not 
for  these Muslim employees, a reliance that only deepened as Britain expanded 
across  the Muslim world  in  the early  twentieth  century and the issues  deemed 
relevant by the British also expanded.
Conclusion
To conclude, by the late 1930s the experience of hajj had undergone a remarkable 
series of changes. Knowledge of the hajj and the pilgrimage experience was more 
widespread  and  deeper  due  to  books  and  vernacular  newspaper  articles,  even 
though  a  large  proportions  of  Muslims  remained  illiterate.  The  Holy  Places  had 
passed from Ottoman to Hashemite then Wahhabi control, the last having the most 
impact on the way hajjis conducted themselves while in the Hijaz. Yet some aspects 
remained recognizable to those from the 1870s. The issue of ‘pauper pilgrims’ for 
the British, and for Ibn Saud, remained as seemingly intractable as ever, one that 
continued to occupy British officials in the Persian Gulf emirates into the late 1950s. 
Britain became involved in the hajj in the 1860s in an attempt to halt the spread of 
cholera, and began an interaction with this religious ritual that lasted for nearly a 
hundred years. Despite the deeper knowledge the British gained of the hajj, one 
persistent feature of this aspect of the relationship between imperialism and Islam 
was Britain’s consistent and largely ineffective attempts to control the hajj.
8 pp.xi-xii, William Roff, (ed.), The Wandering Thoughts of a Dying Man, (Oxford, 1978).
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Abstract
The 1861 cholera epidemic, which began in India and swept through Europe, carried 
by pilgrims on their way to Arabia to perform the hajj, was the catalyst for greater 
British involvement with the fifth pillar  of Islam. British interaction with the hajj, 
which  began  with  supervising  the  quarantine  stations  that  were  established  at 
Arabia's maritime gateways, developed into a bureaucratic apparatus spread over 
Britain's  Muslim  territories,  as  well  as  the  British  Consulate  in  Jedda.  This 
bureaucracy  attempted  to  regulate  various  aspects  of  the  hajj  experience. 
Preventing the spread of epidemic disease remained a primary concern, but other 
duties  the  British  took  upon  themselves  were  assistance  to  so-called  'pauper 
pilgrims'  from British  territories  stranded in Arabia and monitoring the traffic  of 
slaves to Arabia who were passed off as pilgrims. As Britain became the ruler of the 
largest number of Muslims in the world in the early twentieth century, it became 
acutely conscious of its expanded role in facilitating the smooth operation of the 
hajj each year, as an advertisement to its Muslim subjects that Britain was sensitive 
and  supportive  towards  Islam.  British  sensitivity  towards  this  Islamic  ritual  was 
further shown in its sponsoring of Indian Muslim soldiers based in Egypt to perform 
the hajj during the First World War. 
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